policy.
1 For example, Cifuentes et al. (2001) simply assumes climate policy uniformly reduces pollution across all spatial areas. Other studies use much more sophisticated air quality modeling to estimate the effects of emissions reductions. Bell and colleagues conclude that although the various studies are difficult to compare, the results provide "strong evidence" that the shortterm ancillary benefi ts to public health of climate policy are "substantial." Burtraw et al. (2003) focus on the responses to climate policy of electric power generators.
2 Using a sophisticated simulation model of electricity supply, the authors show that a carbon tax would have ancillary health benefi ts from reduced NO x emissions of about eight dollars per metric ton of carbon. Since emissions of SO 2 are capped, they note that there are no ancillary health benefi ts from SO 2 emissions, but they estimate additional benefi ts from avoided future investment in emissions control equipment. Groosman, Muller, and O'Neill (2009) estimate similar effects with a sophisticated model of pollutant transport. 3 Ancillary benefi ts from climate policy have also been studied in agriculture and forestry where climate policy could benefi t soil quality, wildlife habitat, water quality, and landscape aesthetics. 4 Finally, ancillary benefi ts have been estimated to be substantial in developing countries where regulation of pollutants may be less stringent. 
The Theory of Spillovers from Climate Policy
Emissions are generally modeled using one of three equivalent approaches: as an input in the production process, as a joint product that is a "bad," or as abatement from some hypothetical level, for example, business as usual. The fi rst approach has a number of advantages for modeling spillovers from climate policy since it is readily adaptable to modeling multiple pollutants and allows for a broad range of substitution possibilities. Moreover, it allows a simple way to model climate policies, for example, a carbon tax or cap and trade, as an increase in the price of CO 2 emissions (from a zero price).
In this framework, climate policy spillovers are shifts in input demands in response to an increase in the price of CO 2 . Theory shows that input 1. See also European Environment Agency (2004). 2. Ancillary benefi ts have also been studied in transportation; see Walsh (2008) and Mazzi and Dowlatabadi (2007) .
3. The more conservative estimates in Groosman and colleagues recognize that emissions of SO 2 are capped.
4. See Feng, Kling, and Gassman (2004) , Plantinga and Wu (2003) , and Pattanayak et al. (2002) . Elbakidze and McCarl (2004) point out that ancillary benefi ts must be skeptically considered with agricultural offsets since offset emissions reductions from other sectors might also have ancillary benefi ts.
5. See Dudek, Golub, and Strukova (2003) for analysis of ancillary benefi ts in Russia; Dessus and O'Connor (2003) for analysis of Chile; and Joh et al. (2003) for analysis of Korea. Greenstone (2003) studies pollutant spillovers across media and fi nds little evidence that the CAAAs increase releases into waterways and the ground. demand may either increase or decrease, depending on whether the input is a substitute or a complement to CO 2 . Additionally, the effects of climate policy can be decomposed into two effects: an output effect, which generally decreases the demand for all inputs, and a substitution effect, which depends on whether the inputs are net substitutes or net complements for CO 2 . 6 Importantly, demand for pollution inputs that are net substitutes can still fall with climate policy if the output effect outweighs the substitution effect.
7
To illustrate these principles, consider electricity generation that leads to emissions of SO 2 and NO x , as well as CO 2 . Suppose climate policy caused dual fuel generating units to switch from fuel oil to natural gas. Since natural gas generally has lower sulphur content than fuel oil, SO 2 and CO 2 would be net complements: for a given amount of electricity emissions of SO 2 would be lower in response to climate policy. Since the output effect also serves to reduce SO 2 emissions, climate policy would have ancillary benefi ts from SO 2 . Now suppose that climate policy caused natural gas-fi red generating units to increase their combustion temperature, which reduces CO 2 emissions but increases NO x emissions. In this case CO 2 and NO x would be net substitutes. Note however, that since the output effect leads to a reduction in NO x emissions, the overall effect may still be a reduction in NO x emissions from climate policy if the output effect is stronger than the substitution effect. Thus, climate policy could have ancillary benefi ts or ancillary costs.
Spillovers are illustrated in fi gure 5.1 for the case of electricity production with emissions of CO 2 and NO x . The fi rst panel of fi gure 5.1 shows the input demand for CO 2 . If marginal productivity is decreasing (the usual case) then the input demand (equivalently the value of the marginal product) is downward sloping. The fi rm would increase use of an input if the value of the marginal product were greater than the input cost. Thus at the optimum, the value of the marginal product equals the input cost. In the unregulated equilibrium, this marginal product would be zero and CO 2 emissions would be e 0 CO2 . If climate policy increases the price of CO 2 emissions to t CO2 , for example through a carbon cap or tax, then CO 2 emissions would fall to e 1 CO2 . Panel B of fi gure 5.1 illustrates the spillovers to NO x emissions from climate policy. In the absence of climate policy, the NO x input demand is illustrated by the downward sloping solid line and NO x emissions are e 0 NOx . The response of NO x emissions to climate policy depends on two factors: (a) whether NO x and CO 2 are substitutes or complements, and (b) regulations on NO x emissions. In general NO x and CO 2 can be substitutes or 6. These effects are equivalent to income and substitution effects from demand theory. Deschênes (chapter 2, this volume) develops an equivalent framework for labor demand with scale and substitution effects.
7. Decomposing responses into output and substitution effects is also useful since output effects may not be effective for reducing emissions if regulations are incomplete or fi rms have market power. See Holland (2012) for further discussion of output effects with incomplete regulation.
complements. If NO x and CO 2 are complements, then climate policy leads to an inward shift in the input demand for NO x , that is, decreases the demand for NO x emissions. On the other hand, if NO x and CO 2 are substitutes, then climate policy increases the demand for NO x emissions.
Whether or not climate policy changes, NO x emissions depends crucially on the environmental regulation of the NO x emissions. Two polar . This output effect will serve to reduce emissions of both CO 2 and NO x . Note that the output effect makes it unlikely that NO x and CO 2 would be gross substitutes since the substitution effect (which increases NO x emissions) would need to outweigh the output effect (which decreases NO x emissions).
Holland (2010) illustrates the proper valuation of climate policy spillovers for benefi t-cost analysis. Two results are noteworthy. First, spillovers can affect the optimal carbon price. In particular, if there are ancillary benefi ts, then the optimal carbon price would be set higher than the marginal damages. Second, spillovers should be included in benefi t-cost analysis just as other benefi ts or costs are included. In fact, from a theoretical standpoint, spillovers are indistinguishable from changes in any other input, such as labor. However, care must be taken to evaluate environmental spillovers according to their damages since market prices are not available. Holland (2010) also extends the theoretical analysis in this section by deriving theoretical predictions. In particular, both the input demand and conditional input demand must be decreasing in the own price and output effects must be negative. These predictions will aid in the identifi cation of empirical models.
Estimation Strategy
Spillovers resulting from responses to climate policy cannot be directly estimated in industries that are not yet subject to climate policy. Moreover, in industries currently subject to climate policy, it would be difficult to dis-8. Burtraw et al. (2003) note that the falling NO x price may have benefi ts from avoided future control equipment.
entangle the effects of climate policy from the effects of other environmental regulations.
To overcome these difficulties, I exploit the symmetry of input substitution and estimate the response of CO 2 emissions to the change in the price of NO x emissions.
9 This has two advantages. First, NO x emissions have been regulated extensively so it is possible to design an estimation strategy with variation in NO x regulations. Second, CO 2 was not regulated, so there is no need to disentangle the effects of the NO x regulation from CO 2 regulation. To proxy for changes in NO x prices, I use changes in attainment status under the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAAs). Regions that fail to achieve an ambient air quality standard are deemed to be in nonattainment. Designation as nonattainment under the CAAAs triggers additional regulations, which vary according to each state's implementation plan (SIP). 10 In this study, attainment status for one-hour ozone proxies for the price of NO x , which is a primary ozone precursor. Since California had multiple changes into and out of attainment, the analysis focuses on California power plants.
The estimation strategy uses a fi xed effects estimator. The basic estimating equation is:
where Emiss it is emissions (of NO x , CO 2 , or SO 2 ) from generating unit i at time t; Nonattain it is a dummy variable indicating that unit i is in nonattainment for one-hour ozone at time t; f i is a unit-specifi c fi xed effect; g i t is a unit-specifi c linear trend; v jt is a market-year-month fi xed effect for market j; and ε it is the error term. To correct for possible serial correlation, the error term, ε it , is clustered at the generating unit. The parameter of interest, β, indicates the response of emissions to a change in attainment status. Since the nonattainment dummy is a proxy for an increase in the price of NO x emissions, the estimated coefficient captures the own price effect when NO x emissions is the dependent variable. With CO 2 emissions as the dependent variable, the estimated coefficient captures the spillover. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that NO x and CO 2 are gross substitutes (complements). The own and spillover conditional (net) effects can be estimated by controlling for output in equation (1), and the output effect can be estimated directly when output is the dependent variable. 11 9. Exploiting symmetry requires care since it only holds for marginal changes. See Holland (2010) appendix 2 for details on the symmetry of input substitution.
10. For detailed descriptions of the regulatory effects of nonattainment designation under the CAAAs, see Greenstone (2002) .
11. By estimating ln(Emiss it ) = β c Nonattain it + β MWh ln(MWh it ) + f i + g i t + ν jt + ε it and ln(MWh it ) = β′ Nonattain it + f i + g i t + ν jt + ε it in addition to equation (1), all four derivatives in the Slutsky equation in Holland (2010) appendix 2 are estimated separately. However, the identity β = β MWh β′ + β c holds since the sample and all conditioning variables are identical.
Most of the potentially confounding variation is controlled for by the fi xed effects. The unit-specifi c fi xed effects capture any differences in emissions across units due to fuel-mix, generation technology, generator capacity, installed emissions control equipment, or any other time-invariant characteristics of the generating units. The unit-specifi c linear trends capture any trends at the unit level, for example, phasing out of old units. The marketyear-month fi xed effects are a vector of indicators for each month of each year for each market; for example, one indicator is for January 1999 for the northern California market (NP15) and another indicator is for January 1999 for the southern market. The market-year-month fi xed effects capture all variation over time such as seasonal effects and changes in relative fuel prices, in labor costs, in capital costs, and in regulations affecting all generators as well as differences across the markets. This fl exible set of fi xed effects captures most of the potentially confounding effects.
Given this extensive set of nonparametric controls, model identifi cation is based on variation in the attainment status of generating units over time in the sample. Intuitively, the generating units with unchanged attainment status would serve as controls for the generators with changed attainment status (the treated group).
12 The estimated effect would be biased if there were unobserved differential trends in emissions that were correlated with the change in attainment status. This threat to identifi cation is addressed in two ways. First, the multiple changes into and out of attainment in California diminish the potential for bias from unobserved trends. Second, the model incorporates unit-specifi c linear trends to control for any unit-specifi c trends, which would not be captured by the market-year-month fi xed effects.
The estimated spillover effect could also be incorrectly identifi ed if regulatory authorities used the additional statutory authority to attempt to reduce emissions of other pollutants. In this case, changes in attainment status would indicate variations in the prices of both NO x emissions and other pollutants, and the estimated effect would combine the direct and spillover effects. This potential confounding is limited by analyzing spillovers on CO 2 emissions. During the sample period, there was still substantive disagreement over whether CO 2 was a harmful pollutant and CO 2 was neither listed nor regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a criteria pollutant. This lack of regulatory attention to CO 2 emissions suggests that the nonattainment indicator is not a proxy for an increase in the price of CO 2 emissions and that the spillover effect is properly identifi ed.
13
Identifi cation is supported further by the testable predictions from theory. In particular, Holland (2010) shows that own price effects are nonpositive 12. With change at one time in attainment status, the estimator would be similar to the wellknown difference-in-differences estimator.
13. This argument does not hold for SO 2 emissions.
for both factor demands and conditional factor demands and that output effects are nonpositive. A nonpositive estimate of β in equation (1) with NO x emissions as the dependent variable is consistent with the theoretical predictions. With CO 2 emissions as the dependent variable, there are no additional testable implications since cross price effects can be either negative or positive.
Data
This analysis requires data on emissions, generation, attainment status, and other regulations. Availability of the emissions data limit the sample to the years 1997 to 2004. Emissions data come from the hourly US EPA continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS) for power plants. The data are very accurate, include all fossil fuel-fi red generators meeting certain requirements, and have been used in a number of studies.
14 The hourly generating unit-level data are aggregated to the month for three reasons. First, a number of units report emissions in hours for which they report no output. Aggregation accurately captures emissions and output while incorporating any start-up emissions from generating units. Second, if regulations caused a unit to be run fewer hours, disaggregated data would not capture this reduction with the proportional (log) estimating equations. Aggregation captures the zero production hours. Finally, the data are highly serially correlated. Aggregation reduces the problem of serial correlation.
Since California had the most variation in attainment status, the primary analysis focuses on California. Of the twelve counties in California with changes in attainment status, only three counties have relevant power plants: Contra Costa, San Francisco, and San Diego. After dropping nonreports and data inconsistencies, the model identifi cation is based on changes in attainment status at 29 of 178 generating units. The data are discussed further in Holland (2010) .
Estimation Results
The results from estimating equation (1) are presented in table 5.1. Each column reports the results from one of seven regressions. Column (1) reports estimates where ln(NO x ) is the dependent variable, that is, the NO x factor demand, and columns (3) and (5) capture the factor demands for CO 2 and SO 2 . Columns (2), (4), and (6) estimate the conditional factor demands since they control for output, that is, ln(MWh). Column (7) reports estimates from regressing output on the same set of controls. Throughout, the unit fi xed 14. For example, see Puller (2007) , and Holland and Mansur (2008). effects, unit-specifi c linear trends, and market-year-month fi xed effects are highly signifi cant but are not reported.
The estimates of the three testable implications, in columns (1), (2), and (7), are all negative. Thus, the regression results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Moreover these results show that approximately half of the estimated 40 percent reduction in NO x emissions can be attributed to substitution effects with the remainder being attributable to output effects.
The pollutant spillover effects are reported in columns (3) through (6). For CO 2 , the point estimate indicates that nonattainment designation reduced CO 2 emissions by 30 percent, suggesting gross complementarity. Controlling for output, the point estimate is very near zero. This suggests that almost all of the reduction in CO 2 emissions can be attributed to output effects. Similarly, the results for SO 2 , columns (5) and (6), also indicate gross complementarity almost entirely due to output effects. The coefficient for the output effect in column (7) estimates a 30 percent reduction in output with nonattainment designation.
The coefficients on output in (2), (4), and (6) imply emissions elasticities for the three pollutants of 0.8 to 0.9. These estimates are statistically less than one implying that the emissions rates (emissions per MWh) are declining in output. However, the limited net effects suggest that the emissions rates do not vary substantially with changes in prices of other environmental inputs, that is, pollutant spillovers do not change emissions rates. come primarily from the reductions in output and emissions at older plants.
Since newer plants are less polluting, they use the NO x input more efficiently and thus did not reduce output in response to the change in attainment status.
The results are subject to three additional caveats. First, the power of the test is reduced since electric power generators were likely not the marginal polluter targeted by the change in attainment status. In particular, the state implementation plans (SIPs) for reducing NO x emissions do not focus on electric power generation. Second, the estimates cannot control for local economic conditions that may have been correlated with changes in attainment status. Finally, the symmetry assumption requires care in interpreting the coefficients as spillovers from climate policy. Although the estimates are valid estimates of spillovers from ozone policy, they are only locally valid estimates of spillovers from climate policy.
Conclusion
Spillovers from climate policy are important for policy design, modeling, and benefi t-cost analysis. This chapter shows that spillovers arise from output effects (which have ancillary benefi ts) and substitution effects (which may have ancillary benefi ts or ancillary costs). The ambiguous net effect highlights the importance of polluters' responses to climate policy.
The chapter then tests for ancillary benefi ts from climate policy in electricity power generation. The estimates are consistent with ancillary benefi ts from climate policy arising primarily from reductions in output (primarily at older plants) rather than from changes in emissions rates. Note: Regressions additionally control for other regulations, for market-year-month fi xed effects, for generating unit fi xed effects, and for unit-specifi c linear trends.
